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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF ACKNOWLEDGING A
DEED OF GIFT IN MARYLAND
Berman v. Berman'
Meyer Berman was the owner of nine leasehold lots. De-
siring to make a gift of these leaseholds to his two nephews
(plaintiffs in the subsequent litigation), he signed, sealed
and delivered to the nephews a deed purporting to convey
the lots to them. The conveyance was intended as a gratui-
tous gift and was so declared by the grantor to one Wein-
berg, who witnessed the instrument. Approximately three
months later, Mr. Berman died. By his will he bequeathed
all his personal property to his "estate". An estranged wife
and a brother, Jacob, were the nearest kin of the deceased.
The deed to the nephews had not been acknowledged or
recorded at the time of Mr. Berman's death. Following his
death, the nephews filed a bill in equity, asking a decree
declaring the deed in question to be an absolute and irre-
vocable gift of the lots therein described, for an accounting,
and for further relief. The estranged wife, individually,
and as administratrix, c.t.a., together with the brother,
Jacob, were named as respondents in the bill. To this bill
the widow of Mr. Berman demurred, and the court sus-
tained the demurrer. When plaintiffs declined to plead
further, the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City dismissed
their bill. Upon this action-the sustaining of the demurrer
and dismissal of the bill, - the plaintiffs took an appeal,2
and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The decision evinces an
extension of the Maryland rule exacting a strict compliance
with the conveyancing statutes3 in order to effect a valid
conveyance in the case of a deed of gift.
In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals cited the Maryland statutory
requirements that:
"No estate of inheritance or freehold, or any dec-
laration or limitation of use, or any estate above seven
years, shall pass or take effect unless the deed convey-
ing the same shall be executed, acknowledged and
recorded as herein provided;..
69 A. 2d 271 (Md. 1949).
2 Ibid.
& Md. Code (1939 and Suppl.), Art. 21.




"Every deed of real property, when acknowledged
and recorded as herein directed, shall take effect as
between the parties thereto from its date."I
The Court did not mention an equally pertinent statutory
stipulation:
"No deed of real property shall be valid for the
purpose of passing title unless acknowledged and
recorded as herein directed."'
The Court of Appeals stated that the two sections which
it cited were "plain and unambiguous", that the deed which
was unacknowledged and unrecorded was void and passed
no title, and that there can be no delivery to effectuate a
gift if the written instrument relied on to evidence the
gift is void, even though, at the time of delivery of the void
instrument, the donor proclaims his intention to effectuate
a gift.
It must be remembered, as the Court recognized, that
the instrument in order to be effective at all had to be
valid as a deed. In many cases it is possible for a court
of equity to regard such an instrument, although unac-
knowledged or otherwise invalid as a deed, as a contract
to convey and grant specific performance of the contract,
by ordering the grantor, or his estate, to execute a valid
and effective deed.7 But in order for Equity to so treat it,
there must be consideration for the conveyance. If actual
value was paid to the grantor, or, if the grantee, relying
on the deed, had entered into possession of the premises
and expended money for improvements thereon, that would
be a sufficient consideration for equity to enforce the
instrument as a contract to convey.' But no such element
was present in this case; the deed was admittedly gratu-
itous, and there was no making of improvements by the
grantees, nor did they even enter into possession. The case,
therefore, makes it plain that the Maryland rule is that
the acknowledgment is an essential part of the deed, and
that without it the instrument is invalid and void, even as
between the parties.
5Md. Code (1939), Art. 21, See. 15.
6 Md. Code (1939), Art. 21, See. 16.
1 See Price v. McDonald, 1 Md. 403 (1851), in which the Court recognized
the power of a court of equity to enforce a deed defectively acknowledged
or recorded, except as against a bona fide purchaser.
O'See Schluderberg v. Dietz, 156 Md. 547, 144 A. 774 (1929), with respect
* to possession and Hall v. Sharp Street Station, 155 Md. 654, 142 A. 50
(1928), with respect to improvements.
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The rule in most jurisdictions of the United States is
otherwise. In a majority of the States, the acknowledgment
is not an essential part of the deed of conveyance, but is
merely a pre-requisite to recording.9 Under this theory,
an unacknowledged deed is a valid instrument. Being
unacknowledged, it is not entitled to recording, and hence
constructive notice of the transfer of title cannot be given.
Therefore, as a practical matter, an acknowledgment, under
the majority rule, would also be required so that the
instrument could be iecorded and the conveyance thereby
given protection through the doctrine of constructive
notice. But, under this view, an unacknowledged deed even
while unrecorded is effective between the parties to it,
and enforceable against the grantor, his heirs and privies.
In a majority of the American jurisdictions, therefore, the
unacknowledged and unrecorded deed in the Berman case
would have been valid as against the grantor, his heirs, or
the administratrix or other representatives of his estate.
Thus it is obvious that the Maryland rule, as indicated
in this case, follows a strict minority view. The leading
case on the strict view is Lewis v. Herrera.10 In that case
Lewis made a deed of gift to his wife. The deed was not
acknowledged. Lewis subsequently became insolvent and
a judgment of record was obtained against him by the
receiver of a bank. Lewis then acknowledged the deed.
The court there held that the deed, as originally given, was,
for lack of acknowledgment, ineffective to convey title and
that before the deed was acknowledged the litigation insti-
tuted by the Bank had removed it from his power to convey.
The case is not as clear-cut as the Maryland case and is
further complicated by an Arizona statute which stated
that such a deed, not for valuable consideration, would be
void unless the grantor was possessed of sufficient property
to pay his existing debts. On appeal, the decision was
affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court.1
In Alabama 2 and Ohio 8 it has been held that an
acknowledgment is an essential part of the instrument, and
*See cases collected in 1 C. J. S. 780, Acknowledgments, Sec. 6, ns. 29,
30, 31; 1 Am. Jur. 323, Acknowledgments, Sec. 17, n. 13. See also 1 C. J. S.
781 (n. 46), which indicates that where recording is essential to validity
and an acknowledgment is necessary to validly record, failure to acknowl-
edge may prove fatal indirectly.
10 10 Ariz. 74, 85 Pac. 245 (1906).
U Lewis v. Herrera, 208 U. S. 309 (1908).
12 Chadwick v. Carson, 78 Ala. 116 (1884) ; Watson v. Herring, 115 Ala.
271, 22 So. 28 (1897).
I Smith's Lessee v. Hunt, 13 Ohio 260 (1844).
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yet it is doubtful whether those courts would hold such a
deed invalid as against the grantor and his heirs.
In considering the desirability of the strict Maryland
rule, it is interesting to note that acknowledgments were
unknown at common law. The acknowledgment came
into being as commonly desirable to identify the grantor
following the enactment of the Statute of Enrollments in
England." Although the Statute of Enrollments was not
adopted in the United States and has long since ceased to
be of any importance in England following the development
of the lease and release method of conveying, acknowledg-
ments are still in common use in the United States.
In Illinois the requirement of an acknowledgment on a
deed was challenged as an unconstitutional impairment of
the right to contract, but the court easily answered this by
pointing out that the Legislature could require an acknowl-
edgment of certain types of contracts, just as the right to
require a seal upon certain types of contracts had always
been admitted. 15
Maryland also follows a strict view in regard to the
necessity of recording. While at common law in England
there was no requirement of recording of deeds, such
recording has been required in this country since an early
date." It should be remembered that the main purpose of
recording is to apprise third parties (prospective pur-
chasers, mortgagees, etc.) of the status of the title. Against
this background, the Maryland law is strict when it
requires:
"Every deed of real property, when acknowledged
and recorded as herein directed shall take effect as
between the parties thereto from its date." 7 (Emphasis
supplied).
"No deed of real property shall be valid for the
purpose of passing title unless acknowledged and
recorded as herein directed."' 8 (Emphasis supplied).
In construing these sections, the Maryland Court of Appeals
has said:
"The recording is the final and complete act which
passes the title, until this is accomplished everything
"Statute of Enrollments, 27 Henry VIII, c. 16.
Parrott v. Kumpf, 102 Ill. 423 (1882).
For a compilation of requirements, see 45 Am. Jur. 434-5, Records and
Recording Laws, See. 28.
" Supra, n. 5.18Supra, n. .
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else is unavailing. As the recording is necessary to the
passing of the title, it must follow as a matter of course
that until the recording takes place, the title remains
in the grantor. The registered deed shows the title;
whatever other rights may arise from the unregistered
deed, it cannot effect a transmission of the legal title.
... The faith and credit which the law intends to give
to the registry would be greatly weakened if at any
moment there could be a legal title by deed, which did
not appear upon the registration records."'
The Court is here speaking of legal title and it would
follow in the Berman case that even if the deed had been
acknowledged, still it would not pass legal title in Mary-
land if not recorded. The equitable title would pass, but,
as was pointed out, there was no consideration or other
element present to justify equity acting to convert this
equitable title into a legal title. Of course, as a practical
matter, if there had been an acknowledgment, but not a
recording in the Berman case, legal title could have been
transferred by the simple act of recording the deed at any
time prior to trial. For, the recording may be made by
anyone and need not be made by the grantor. This is a
basic difference between the strict requirement of an
acknowledgment and the strict requirement of recording
as essential to pass title - the recording, which may be
made by anyone, may be made after the death of the
grantor; but the acknowledgment can be made only by the
grantor, and his death, without acknowledging, means that
in Maryland the legal title can never be transferred, except
in those cases where equity can act to perfect it. The Mary-
land rule, therefore, would plainly seem to be that where
there is an unacknowledged deed of gift, and the grantor
is dead, and there is no ground for equitable intervention,
the deed must fail completely.
But there is one other possible way of perfecting such
an unacknowledged deed as was present in the Berman
case, and it would have been most interesting if this means
had been attempted in that case. This way is through the
medium of the Curative Acts,2" and whether or not they
would perfect the deed in this case would depend upon two
questions concerning the Curative Acts which have not, as
yet, been determined in Maryland. Would it have been
possible for the grantees under the unacknowledged deed,
Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 186, 23 A. 736, 739 (1892).
Md. Code (1939 and Suppl.), Art. 21, Sees. 102, 103, 107.
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instead of filing their bill in Equity to have their title
established, to have waited until the enactment of the next
Curative Act, and then to have submitted the deed for
recording, on the theory that the Curative Act had cured
the lack of acknowledgment? If the Recorder refused to
record the deed, the grantees could have sued out a writ
of mandamus to compel him to record it. If the mandamus
were contested we would then have drawn into issue the
two doubtful questions regarding the force and effect of
the Curative Acts. The two questions are: (1) Whether
the Curative Act operates only upon recorded deeds or
whether it could operate upon unrecorded deeds as well;
(2) Whether the Curative Act cures only defective
acknowledgments or whether it would cure the total lack
of an acknowledgment.
Looking to the history and nature of the Curative Acts
we find that the Curative Acts are attempts, by the Legis-
lature, to cure certain defects in deeds and other instru-
ments so as to afford greater certainty to the merchant-
ability of title. In Maryland these acts originated as
private Curative Acts, passed at the instance of individual
citizens to cure defective deeds which they held."' These
were subsequently developed into blanket Curative Acts
which operate upon all deeds and other instruments within
the scope created by the Legislature. The Acts are retro-
spective and operate only upon instruments which have
been executed prior to the enactment of the Curative Act.
For this reason the Acts must be re-enacted periodically so
as to take effect upon deeds which are executed subsequent
to the passage of the then current Act. At present the
Maryland Curative Acts are re-enacted every other year.
In the Berman case the deed was executed in March of
1948, and the grantor died in June of 1948. Therefore this
deed was executed subsequent to the Curative Act which
became effective June 1, 1947 and it would have been
necessary to wait until June 1, 1949 for the next Curative
Act to operate upon it.22 The question then is, could the
Curative Act have operated upon it?
The first problem is whether the Curative Acts may
cure unrecorded deeds. Generally speaking, a curative act
is capable of curing any defects within the scope created
11 See Lessee of Dulany et al. v. Tilghman, 6 G. & J. 461 (1834), in which
the Private Curative Act of 1787 is discussed.
2See Md. Code Supp. (1947). The current Curative Statutes constitute
Chapter 159, Laws of Maryland, approved March 31, 1949, to take effect
June 1, 1949, repealing and reenacting Art. 21, Secs. 102, 103 and 107, which
sections were effective since June 1, 1947.
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for it by the Legislature. The scope of an act, therefore,
depends upon the language therein.23 There are several
Curative Acts, in Maryland, intended to cure various types
of imperfections,24 but the language of the Curative Act
pertinent to the deed in question would seem to be broad
enough to permit the Act to operate upon unrecorded deeds.
Concerning recording the Act is worded in the disjunctive
and reads:
"All deeds, mortgages, releases, bonds of convey-
ances, bills of sale, chattel mortgages and all other
conveyances, of real or personal property, or of any
interest therein or agreements relating thereto, which
may have been executed, acknowledged or recorded
in the State subsequent to the passage of the Act of
General Assembly of Maryland, passed at its January
session, 1858, Chap. 208, which may not have been
acknowledged according to the laws existing at the
time of said acknowledgment . . .are hereby made
valid... ."25 (Emphasis supplied).
It appears, therefore, that this Act does not require that
the deeds be recorded, and this contention is strengthened
by a comparison of this section with the Curative Acts in
Secs. 102 and 107 of Article 21, both of which expressly
require that the instrument be "recorded".20
Turning to the second problem, whether the Curative
Act will cure a total lack of acknowledgment, the situation
is more complicated. The pertinent Maryland Act 2 covers
deeds... "which may not have been acknowledged accord-
ing to the laws existing at the time of said acknowledg-
ments", and then goes on to enumerate certain acts which
would not fully comply with the formal requirements of an
acknowledgment. It is doubtful but still debatable whether
these words could be held to be indicative of a legislative
intent to cure a complete lack of acknowledgment. Gen-
erally throughout the United States curative acts are held
to cure only defects in the acknowledgment and will not
supply an acknowledgment where there is none.28 There
is also a conflict in other jurisdictions of the United States
IsCooper v. Harvey, 21 'S. Dak. 471, 113 N. W. 717 (1907), cited in 1
C. J. S. 881, Acknowledgments, n. 93.
" Supra, n. 20.
10 Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 21, Sec. 103.
Thus, Sec. 107 says "executed and recorded". (Emphasis added.)
Supra, n. 25.
IWilliford v. Davis, 106 Okla. 208, 232 P. 828 (1924), affirmed in Davis




over the nature of the defects which may be cured by a
curative statute where there has been some attempt to
acknowledge. It was once contended that curative acts
could cure only immaterial, formal defects and that where
the statute required an acknowledgment to pass title, an
act which cured a material defect in an acknowledgment
would be unconstitutional since its effect would be to divest
title from one and vest it in another. But the more reason-
able view and the majority view is that such defects may
properly be cured by statute.29 The prevailing thought is
that curative acts should be construed liberally. Maryland
is in accord with this and has construed its Curative Acts
to be capable of curing rather material defects. 80 Consider-
ing the power of the Legislature to cure, by Curative Acts,
defects in the taking and certification of acknowledgments,
there seems to be no reason why the Legislature cannot
cure any defect whatsoever. If the Court should hold that
the Curative Acts are capable of curing any defects in an
acknowledgment, including material, substantial defects,
but are incapable of curing a complete want of acknowl-
edgment, then it would appear that any attempt at acknowl-
edging, no matter how ineffective, could ultimately suffice
to pass legal title. This would mean that the acknowledg-
ment would be basically a psychological requirement,
intended to impress upon the grantor, by its solemnity,
the importance of the act of transfer, rather than an identi-
fication measure as the acknowledgment was originally
intended to be.
Considering that Maryland in its strict requirement of
an acknowledgment is following a distinct, minority view,
which works a hardship in the limited number of deed of
gift cases, the Court would have available an excellent
means of alleviating that hardship, if it desires, without
changing this strict requirement of an acknowledgment,
by simply ruling that Sec. 103 of the Curative Act does
operate upon unrecorded deeds and is capable of curing a
total lack of acknowledgment.
0See 22 L. R. A. 379 (Re-Constitutionality) ; 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1078
(Re-Nature of Defects Cured).
40See MeDivit v. McDivit, 148 Md. 271, 129 A. 291 (1925), in which the
Curative Act of 1924, which acted upon deeds "acknowledged or recorded"
was held to cure the following very material defects in an acknowledg-
ment ... (1) Name of the grantor did not appear therein, (2) Not shown
from acknowledgment whether it was taken by a justice of the peace or
notary public, (3) Not shown thereby that the officer taking the acknowl-
edgment was of Baltimore City or elsewhere. The deed, with the defective
acknowledgment had been recorded. Cited in 1 C. J. S. 881, Acknowledg-
ments, ns. 98, 99 and 7.
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